Kabul Airlift Vol. III
My involvement overall in the deployment with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) was as the Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) Detachment Officer in Charge (MOS 0802/8002). With me were 3 Fire Support Marines (MOS 0861) and 1 Communications Marine (MOS 0621). I was the team’s only qualified and authorized Joint Terminal Attack Controller. Together, we formed Firepower Control Team (FCT) 2, callsign “Sicario” and fell under MEU Fires within the 24th MEU’s Command Element (CE).
Without further blabbering, here are my experiences.
From the start, loading plans began to get botched as the Air Force did not have the proper forces to respond to the NEO and was sluggish in acquiring the assets necessary to insert the NEO force. Additionally, Army units upstream and co-located with the C-17s would commandeer loading spaces for their "required" equipment for the NEO, even though their initial part in the evacuation was minimal for all intents and purposes, despite what they would lead you to believe. That said, Soldiers early in the operation would assist in evacuating United States Embassy personnel in Kabul.
The first 24th MEU elements began departing Al-Jaber via busses bound for Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait, in the pre-dawn hours of August 12th, 2021. Due to a lack of aviation assets to support the transport of the NEO force, I was pushed back to the morning of August 13th and would eventually insert with C Co, BLT 1/8, and an Army Doctor. We would have to wait nearly 20 more hours at Ali Al Salem to source a C-17, eventually lifting off around midnight of August 14/15. Right before the touchdown at HKIA, everyone onboard my flight donned their PPE and went condition three as the airfield status was undetermined at the time of landing due to a communications vacuum that occurred once you departed Al-Jaber and were staged in Ali Al Salem. Everything at that point was reasonably calm, apart from the evacuation of the United States Embassy. No crowds were gathering, and commercial aircraft were still operating, but there was sporadic gunfire from outside the walls of HKIA that increased exponentially as that day went on.
...
No more than a few minutes after closing my eyes, there was a total security breach at the international and domestic terminals, and Afghan civilians began streaming into the airfield, threatening to derail the entirety of the NEO. The JOC began sending runners to the barracks to assemble all hands on deck for the airfield’s defense. Due to the minimum numbers on deck at that time, things were looking bleak, and the runways had to be cleared as the survival of the NEO and the forces on the ground depended on the C-17s landing and departing. Everyone in sight began running to the runways to form a barricade. Chaos ensued.
The quick reaction force (QRF) from 10th Mountain, Task Force Polar Bear, drove their vehicles across the field to form a line, with 24th MEU Marines running behind them to fill the gaps with the limited personnel available. Gunfire from the terminals was constant, and Army and Marine personnel hesitated to return fire. In hindsight, I believe this was the Taliban trying to incite fear in the crowd more than them trying to hit American units running across the field. It was a scene of absolute chaos, which resorted in the first firings of warning shots to control the crowds. At this point, the crowd was very responsive to Task Force Polar Bear's warning shots. Afghan civilians began trying to infiltrate hangars and staging areas, attempting to board aircraft forcibly. Luckily, with the support of Marines, aircrews could fend off the Afghan civilians. The pilots would also assist by throttling their aircraft's engines to deter the Afghan civilians from attempting to get near the aircraft, as the jet blast from the engines would blow away the Afghan civilians running close to the aircraft’s loading ramp.
Just before the security breach, a platoon from B Co BLT 1/8 had landed, and I attached myself to them as we began securing the aircraft they had just deboarded and began to establish the western flank of the American line. The measures we had to use for the crowd varied from warning shots and flashbangs to physical altercations with the Afghan civilians who did not listen and posed a threat to themselves, friendly forces around them, or the NEO as a whole. At that point, I had never experienced the desperation of a human to ignore all elements that would harm them just for the feeling of safety. Soon, warning shots lost their effect, and, in some instances, things turned into fistfights as the American forces and Afghan civilians fought for their survival. We knew we would be running for the hills surrounding Kabul if no aircraft could land and the airport was overrun. The Afghan people knew that if they could not get on an airplane, they would be subjected to the harsh realities of Taliban law.
The struggle to regain control of the runways and the airport lasted all night and into the morning hours, with relative control established as the sun rose. At this point, American forces could lay concertina wire across most of the entry points near the domestic and international terminals on HKIA. This cordoned a vast group of civilians into a small entry space that A Co, BLT 1/8, under the charge of Captain Sam McGrury, could manage with its company and a few attachments to help bolster their numbers. The security of this group was fragile as the MEU did not have enough forces on the ground to do much better. At this point, I went back to the JOC to try to sleep as the interpreter PSD task would start that morning at 0800, when I was supposed to initially support C Co BLT 1/8 with opening a new gate called North Gate as it was assessed that funneling all evacuees through Abbey Gate would severely limit the number of throughput as we were expected to begin processing large numbers of American citizens (AMCITS) and SIV (Special Immigrant Visas for Afghans) holders that day.
As in many cases, the actions on the airfield were driven by Majors, Captains, and SNCOs, taking charge of a situation and making their best judgment calls. Frankly, the formative experience of many leaders was the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, where we largely remained in control of the situation in the grand scheme of things. It was apparent throughout that some leaders struggled to perform in an environment that entirely lacked structure or procedures. Additionally, even when leaders provided good guidance structure, the communication infrastructure and lack of overall unity of command made it very difficult to disseminate that guidance for coordination across different nationalities and services. It was very possible for specific units to be highly structured at specific times but simultaneously be entirely uncoordinated with those around or over them.
The date was August 16th, 2021. About two or 3 three after "securing" the runways, A Co 1/8 took contact from individuals who had infiltrated the airfield with weapons. A Co took care of the contacts quickly and professionally, but this only served to rile the crowd up. Around this time, I was scouting the area around what would be designated as North Gate with one of the interpreters named Seth. Seth was a top-tier interpreter who served with American SOF units throughout the war in Afghanistan. Seth was an incredible asset to have, as he was incredibly fit and could work long hours. He was also extremely charming and could control a large swath of evacuees with few words. He knew US ground tactics enough to insert himself in the best position possible with the most effect. While scouting the North Gate area, we encountered HUMINT assets trying to recover designated VIPs in the turnstile area of the North Gate (34.572328, 69.223045), so Seth was able to assist the situation as there were individuals who were threatening the VIPs and were also attempting to gain unauthorized entrance into HKIA.
Around this time, C Co 1/8 was arriving to begin setting up the checkpoint for evacuee processing. Five or ten minutes after their arrival, the Company Commander and I received an alert on the radio, demanding all hands on deck to report to the runways to secure them as there had been another breach. Seth and I ran from North Gate to the north aprons, Apron 8 in particular, in front of the processing terminal (34.572328, 69.223045). What we ran up to was, again, absolute chaos. Luckily this time, there was no gunfire incoming, but the number of evacuees that had flooded the field was incredible and exponentially larger than the crowd from the night before. Thousands upon thousands had overrun the runways and southern sections of the airfield. Once again, every person possible, regardless of MOS, was out on the airfield pushing back the Afghan civilians. Task Force Polar Bear deployed, utilizing their vehicles to help in the control, using warning shots, loudspeakers, and the mass of their vehicles to help move people back. This struggle was worse than the previous night's overrun, as the sheer amount of Afghan evacuees made control incredibly difficult. Around this time, I began to see the first elements of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (2/1), and the Army's 82nd Airborne on deck.
This struggle to secure the runways is the struggle that Americans back at home first saw the chaos of HKIA on their TVs. During this struggle, Apache helicopters began sweeping the runway to deter Afghan civilians from moving forwards. This is also the struggle in which several Afghan evacuees would cling to a C-17, only to fall off moments after liftoff—a moment forever burned into my memory. For about 15 seconds, everything turned calm as the C-17 forced its way to take off, and then everyone on the airfield saw the bodies drop. It was as if we were living in slow motion, and everyone's head followed the C-17 to the sky and then followed the falling bodies to the ground. The following realization of what just occurred caused the entire airfield to pause. The only sound you could hear was the jet engines in the distance and the brief moan of utter disbelief from all those on the ground. After that moment, it seemed like there was a mindset shift in the Afghans. It was now the Afghan populace against the American forces on the ground. Things became infinitely more difficult as the Afghan civilians became incredibly unruly and defiant to the demands of American forces.
I realize only in reflection that it seemed like a game before this moment. Everything was a spectacle, and most Afghan civilians who had run on the field were there for the free ride, to see what the commotion was about, or just to have a good time. Individuals were laughing and playing games, as you'd expect from toddlers. I remember that I was shocked to see so many "military-aged males" joking around with their friends and daring each other who could be the most defiant to the orders given to them by the Americans trying to secure the airfield. Honestly, it was a joke to them. Now I know this doesn't apply to the entire group of people that had rushed that airfield, but I distinctly remember people running with the C-17 or who had hopped onto the landing gear that was smiling and laughing as if it were a joyous occasion.
I tried to explain this situation to my wife months after returning home when I would see newsreels about the NEO, and the news agencies would use the same footage of people running alongside the C-17. In that stock footage, you can see that people are not direly trying to survive but merely having a good time. It's disgusting. I could not find the words to describe the disgust I felt. I felt small and alone in that moment as if we were all a part of a joke, and the joke was on us.
All of that changed when those individuals fell from the sky to the ground below."