Kabul Evac: The Beirut Battalion

Hard-Hitters:
Comparing 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment’s Experience in Beirut 1983 and Kabul 2021

-Stash, writing for Northern Provisions

Part One: 1/8 Marines in Beirut, Lebanon, May-October 1983

Our First Duty
Peering from their castle-like fortifications that dotted the outskirts of Beirut International Airport (BIA), the Marines and attached Naval personnel of 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment (1/8) were not the first Marines of the Multi-National Peacekeeping Force (MNPF) in Lebanon, nor the last; but their 1983 deployment in the “Paris of the Middle East,” would prove to be the most pivotal, and lethal, amid the gradually-escalating Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990). To all but the uninitiated, 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, or “1/8,” (pronounced ‘One-Eight,’), is known throughout the Marine Corps as the “Beirut Battalion,” honoring the 241 Marines and attached servicemembers who perished during the suicide-vehicle-borne-improvised explosive device (SVBIED) that crashed and detonated at their battalion landing team (BLT) 1/8 headquarters on October 23d, 1983, which killed 241 U.S Servicemembers; 220 Marines, 18 sailors and 3 soldiers. As the savage climax of our peacekeeping efforts in Beirut, the BLT 1/8 bombing on October 23d 1983 signaled not only a change in the tactics of political-military terrorism, but ushered in a new era of radicalized irregular warfare that still threatens U.S servicemembers abroad, as evidenced by suicide bombing during the Kabul Airlift of 2021, which killed 13 servicemembers (11 Marines, 1 sailor and 1 soldier), wounded 45 U.S servicemembers and killed another 169 Afghan civilians.  Hard-hitters all, 1/8 Marines are the proud successors of some of the most complex, and vicious, periods of U.S Marine Corps history. Created during the force-expansion of the early 20th century, 1/8 Marines would be immediately called upon to conduct complex military operations worldwide. This wide and varied military experience involved both conventional and unconventional applications to combat situations. From clashing with elusive Caco bandits, training local gendarmes in Haiti, to obliterating Japanese redoubts on Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Saipan, and Okinawa, the combat-chronicle of 1/8 Marines can only be described as hard-hitting. Time and circumstance have proven, again and again, that each generation of 1/8 Marines (whatever nicknames or monikers might attach themselves to units after an operation) is the same Marine breed. The 1/8 Marines in Beirut during 1983 and Kabul 2021 are no exception. As their predecessors before them, the 1/8 Marines of Beirut 1983 and Kabul 2021 are no different in the fidelity, courage, and professionalism that Marines are known for.

    Temperature’s Rising
By May 30th, the 24th MAU had relieved the 22nd MAU, as did 1/8, who took over the company and platoon positions from the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines (2/6). Alpha Company secured the southern perimeter of BIA, near the town of Khalde, Bravo Company guarded the northern approaches to BIA, Charlie Company occupied the Lebanese University and library, while Weapons Company Marines were dispersed to even more remote sites for additional guard detail, not least for their tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) Dragon antitank (AT) launchers and light antitank assault weapons (LAAWs). Jointly running seven checkpoints, the LAF-USMC checkpoints were to reflect the escalating conditions in Beirut, as they increased in size, strength, and combat power. BLT 1/8 was to fill over a half-million sandbags from May 29th to October 23rd, 1983, which were used just as much to protect themselves from the ever-increasing small-arms and indirect fire, as to fill idle time. Checkpoints, company areas, platoon positions and bivouac tents resembled sandbagged fortresses, wreathed in camouflage netting and concertina wire. Restricted from occupying the strategic hills to the east, the Marines in the lowland positions of BIA would be inviting, if not clear, targets for the shoot-and-scoot artillerists and gunners of the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and the Shia Amal. Both irregular forces were supported, financed, and trained by the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), respectively. As the civil war progressed during 1/8’s stay, their abilities and capabilities would hint at increased levels of support, as well as guidance and leadership, from their sponsors.

Walk Among Us
BLT 1/8 and assorted LAF units would begin joint patrols on June 25th, averaging four to seven a day. These foot patrols were always varied, never following a pattern, and differed from in size, selected route, and times. Patrol leaders also had the freedom to select their routes, and the authority to change any planned route after the BLT had been notified. In the initial months of their Beirut deployment, BLT 1/8’s patrols would put their Marines in contact with the local civilians, whose attitudes toward, and support for, the Marines would worsen as the in the following months as the security situation worsened. Mobile patrols, two a day, were also mounted throughout the city. These mobile patrols, as varied as the foot patrols, included Jeeps fixed with tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) Dragon anti-tank (AT) weapon systems, which provided Marines with both mobility, firepower, and deterrence. As a further deterrent for any escalation of violence, naval gunfire support and Charlie Battery of 10th Marine Regiment, sporting the new M198 155mm howitzers and Field Artillery Schools Target Acquisition Batteries (FASTAB), were on call. The sandbagged checkpoints, reinforced buildings, improvised bunkers, and slit trenches that became home to 1/8 were tell-tale signs that this proxy war, contained in a civil war, was certainly not ending. The war was evolving. Following the April 18th car bombing that destroyed the U.S embassy in Beirut, which killed 17 Americans, and the signing of the Lebanon-Israeli withdrawal agreement, U.S Marines were now tasked with providing a “presence,” to ensure peace and security were balanced and maintained. Additionally, Marines were to train the Lebanese Armed Forces in small-unit tactics and cohesion, amphibious landings as well as helicopter insertion. As a component of the MNPF, U.S Marines also cross-trained with British, French, and Italian forces, familiarizing themselves with their respective weapons systems.



All Hell Breaks Loose
Labeled as a “permissive environment,” or non-hostile, during September 1982, the inherited positions of BLT 1/8, would be tested as early as 22 July 1983, where a combination of rocket launchers, 122mm Katyusha rockets and 102mm mortars stuck inside Marine positions, wounding two Marines and a sailor. The level of intensity of this “unintentional,” fire emanated from both the terraced buildings surrounding BIA and from the hills to the south and east.  “Proportionality,” was the name of the game when it came to Marine rules of engagement (ROE). Responses to enemy fire were to be measured, ceased after firing stopped, and not followed up with pursuit-by-fire. After the line companies were rotated in early August 1983 (to keep Marines sharp and alert), Marines endured longer and heavier barrages of both rockets and artillery on August 10th and 11th, impacting the areas between the MAU and BLT headquarters buildings and the BIA flightline. August 28th and 29th however, were the opening salvos of the “September,” or “Mountain,” War. In anticipation of the withdrawal of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), all parties (LAF, Druze forces, Shia Amal fighters, Sunni militias) vied for control of those vacated positions straddling BIA. The fighting in the city also intensified, and the Marines manning the intervening checkpoints were caught square in middle of this explosive new chapter of the Lebanese Civil War. The jointly manned checkpoints were now coming under direct attack by Druze, Sunni, and Shia forces, mixing direct assaults, sniping and indirect fire. Firefights now erupted between the exposed Marines and their elusive foes, with some exchanges lasting two hours, accompanied by hundreds of impacts from 82mm and 122mm mortars, recoilless rifles, and rockets. These barrages would kill two Marines from Alpha Company, 2nd Lt. Donald G. Losey and Staff Sergeant Alexander M. Ortega, Jr., while also wounding three other Marines. After taking time to mourn those killed, one Marine, Lance Corporal Ron Medeiros, remarked quietly, “This shit’s for real.”

We Bite
And real it was, for the sudden escalation of the conflict saw the US-contingent of the MNPF retaliating with M198 155mm fire and an increased level of support for LAF offensives toward the ridgelines overlooking BIA and near Khaldeh in September 1983. Later, the use of naval gunfire support would aid the LAF greatly, while undermining the intent of peacekeeping mission at the same time. The training of the LAF eventually paid off, albeit with some mauled companies, but there was no collapse of the LAF. The LAF had also received ample resupply from the Marines to carry the fight further, and the neutrality and impartiality required for peacekeeping operations began to dissipate fast. Direct attacks on checkpoints and allied positions increased, as did the duration and accuracy of indirect fire. With the successful defense of Suq-el-Garb by the LAF, supported by U.S naval gunfire, there were many positive indicators that the peacekeeping mission and the LAF, with its soldiers and officers representing all faiths, would succeed despite the hell that was being unleashed upon them. Furthermore, reconciliation talks in Geneva, Switzerland were being proffered by the warring factions, giving credence to the effects that the LAF, and its MNPF supporters, were making significant gains on the political and military fronts.  These indicators, as Colonel Geraghty, CO of the 24th MAU would claim, are what drove the Syrian- and Iranian-backed militias to go underground and unleash a new form of unconventional warfare.


Horror Business
The blast of October 23rd, 1983 ripped through the BIA compound and sent shockwaves rippling throughout the Marine positions. Now estimated at twenty-one thousand pounds of explosives, primarily composed of pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) used to create a fuel-air explosive (FAE), the suicidal attack by the driver of the yellow Mercedes truck, Ismail Ascari, was unprecedented in the annals of unconventional warfare. Posts 6 and 7, manned by Lance Corporals DiFranco and Linkkila, were unbale to respond effectively, as they had been on guard without their rifle magazine inserted, adhering to the modifications of the ROEs. Crashing through the concertina wire, speeding through an open gate, and navigating the antivehicle pipes that fronted the BLT HQ, the truck bomb hit its intended target. According to the testimonies of Colonel Geraghty and the FBI liaison team sent to investigate, the truck did not even have to slam into the BLT HQ to achieve similar results.  Eight minutes after the explosion rocked the BLT 1/8 HQ, an identical attack, carried out by another suicidal truck driver, detonated fifteen yards outside the French paratrooper’s headquarters. Likewise, the French paratroopers had fired on, and halted, the truck before the explosion killed 58 paratroopers. Both detonations, as later investigations revealed, were command detonated. Any defenses at the BLT 1/8 HQ would have been destroyed due to the force of the explosion, and the anti-vehicle ditches and blast walls recommended by the MAU/BLT leadership were shut down due to the political and diplomatic necessity of keeping the BIA open for air evacuation. The blast that destroyed the BLT HQ was six times as powerful as the one that hit the French paratrooper HQ.

Resurrection
Efforts to rescue and recover the Marines and attached personnel inside the BLT HQ began almost immediately. The use of steel cutters, blowtorches and teams of Marines, Italians and Lebanese civilians utilizing heavy construction equipment were employed to remove the reinforced debris. In parallel, a rush to reestablish radio communications with the line companies, and their various positions and checkpoints, was undertaken. This was in part due to the belief that a follow-on, direct attack would commence and since a large portion of communication infrastructure, and staff, were centralized at the BLT HQ. During the rescue and recovery operations of the BLT HQ, fire from unidentified gunmen peppered the area, frustrating the 1/8 Marines attempting to salvage their comrades. This complex attack on both the BLT’s HQ , and French paratrooper HQ, represented a shift in unconventional warfare, utilizing religiously-motivated, vehicle-borne, suicide ‘commandos,’ to effect a political-military outcome. The outcome that was sought, and achieved by this suicide truck bombing, was the withdrawal of the U.S Marines from Beirut, effected 26 February, 1984 (a little over four months after the attack). As would become known as the single-deadliest day for the Marine Corps since the battle of Iwo Jima in 1945, 241 Marines and attached personnel were killed in the blast with another 70 personnel wounded. However, 273 names which are carved into the Beirut Memorial in Jacksonville, North Carolina, right outside Camp Johnson, includes the names of servicemembers killed during the period of the U.S peacekeeping efforts in Beirut from 1982-1984


Part Two: The Beirut Battalion during the Kabul Airlift, August 2021

Violent World
Changing the game of unconventional warfare, the vehicle-borne suicide attacks in Beirut 1983 would usher in a score of similar attacks in the years leading up to the September 11th attacks in 2001, where radical Islamic fundamentalists would attack significant U.S targets with suicide, vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED). During the intervening years between 1983 and 2001, a pattern of such attacks would be evident in starting in 1996, where the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia would be truck-bombed as would the twin-attacks U.S embassies in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya in 1998. In a series of military campaigns, invasions and occupations that would be collectively known as the Global War on Terrorism (2001-2021), the United States and her allies would seek to mitigate, and destroy, any state-sponsor or safe haven for radical Islamic terrorism. In the years following 9/11/2001, over four million U.S servicemembers have since served and have occupied numerous U.S military bases across Southwest Asia, Central Asia, Africa. The initial, and central, campaign to this twenty-year long war was the War in Afghanistan. Operation Enduring Freedom would comprise the first fourteen years (2001-2014) where major combat operations were launched by the U.S and the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (2015-2021) entailed the slow transition of the counterterrorism fight to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and their National Police (ANP).

From Hell They Came
Seizing the initiative during a political stalemate, the resurgent Taliban would embark upon a series of local and regional offensives in the summer of 2021, which would mark the end of the longest war in U.S military history. From August 6th -8th, Taliban forces seized their first provincial capital, Zaranj, of the Nimruz province. This capture of a provincial capital emboldened the Taliban to seize more provincial capitals, as Farah fell on August 9th -11th as did Kandahar and Herat, from August 12th -13th and Mazar-e-Sharif and Jalalabad from August 14th-15th. A tightening cordon quickly surrounded Kabul, which saw Taliban forces enter the city proper on the morning of the 15th. Much of the ANA, supposedly three-hundred thousand strong, either fled, surrendered, or were paid off, due to the rapidity of the Taliban forces. This startling about-face necessitated the need for the U.S and her allies to continue to send emergency contingents of soldiers, Marines, and special-operations forces to forestall the complete collapse of the capital, Kabul, and evacuate as many U.S citizens and Afghan civilians, as possible. While there were some enclaves of ANA and Afghan commandos who held out with dogged determination, it was not enough to keep the gaining momentum from hitting Kabul.

Like the dual mission that defined the MNPF in Beirut, mainly presence and security, the successors of the Beirut Battalion, would contribute to the evacuation of over one hundred-twenty thousand civilians from the Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) and witness another complex, suicide attack on U.S military forces. Unlike Beirut 1983, where the LAF survived their mauling of the September War, the ANA’s departure from the field left an almost-unfillable security gap which left the U.S and her allies to hold the proverbial bag. In one of the largest airlifts in world history, the individual and collective actions of the Marines and Navy Corpsmen of the Beirut Battalion would reflect the same grit, adaptability, and comradeship as their predecessors.

Where Eagles Dare
In the summer of 2021, as the ground combat element of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), the Marines of 1/8 had been toiling with the new realities of the COVID-19 Pandemic and its secondary effects on military operations Ports of call included Portugal, the United Kingdom, and Greece, where the Marines and Sailors embarked upon an abbreviated training cycles and restricted liberty calls. Common to MEU’s, 1/8’s line companies (Aztec, Bravo, Charlie, and Weapons companies) were dispersed among the fleet and ports of call. Disembarking from their cramped conditions aboard ship, the training with allied foreign nations stressed the basics: patrolling, live-fire exercises as well as weapons familiarization and cross-training with allied servicemembers.  Regardless of the rules mandated by the “COVID MEU,” as it was called, Marine leaders at all levels still performed all the necessary tasks to maintain discipline and readiness throughout all ranks. Physical fitness was continually stressed onboard ship, as were the combat lifesaver classes to deal with mass-casualty situations. Scout Snipers of 1/8 also took the time to hone their craft by firing at floating balloons out to sea. Complementing the dispersed disposition of 1/8’s line companies amongst the MEU, the scuttlebutt of a possible mission to Afghanistan began to fly. Squad leaders held impromptu meetings on the area surrounding HKIA, side SAPI’s (small-arms, protective insert) were issued as were augmented medical kits for the Navy Corpsmen. Giving credence to the rumor mill, and to the additional gear being issued, were the families of some of the Marines, who contacted their loved ones in uniform to ask: “Are you headed to Afghanistan?”

Moreover, 1/8 Marines standing in line at the Al-Jaber chow hall, or DFAC (Dining Facilities Administration Center), were alerted not by their chain of command, but by the news on the wall-mounted television screens, with headlines like “Pentagon: 3000 troops headed to Afghanistan.” Social media posts and articles on the internet also alerted 1/8 Marines as to the current situation at HKIA. To many 1/8 Marines scattered around Kuwait, on working parties or pulling extra guard duty, these backdoors communiques, internet posts, and news headlines were first overt indications that a mission was coming down the pipeline. Others began receiving updated debriefings from their fire team and squad leaders that the mission to assist the Kabul evacuation was likely.

Situation Critical
The Beirut Battalion’s insertion into Kabul, Afghanistan was done piecemeal, as its supporting elements, line companies and even platoons were dispersed around Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and other locations for additional duties. At the time, the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (2/1), the ground-combat element of the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, Crisis Response-Central Command (SPMAGTF-CR-CC) and 10th Mountain Division (USA) had already been in-country and had been providing a significant portion of the existing security detail. Just as important, the ANA had not yet pulled the plug on security. Part of the advance party of 1/8 Marines, 2nd platoon, Aztec Company had already been on the ground, detached to 10th Mountain Division. Stuffed in the back of Airforce C-17’s, the bulk of Aztec and Charlie companies were the first of the Beirut Battalion to assist in the evacuation of civilians. Follow-on elements, including the remainder of Aztec Company as well as Bravo and Weapons companies, were to join up within days later, after being gathered from their disparate locations. The rapid deployment, however piecemeal, and the consolidation of an entire Marine battalion is not a military feat that should be overlooked and should invite further analysis. In transit to Kabul, orders were given to put on their full-kit (i.e., plate-carriers and Kevlar helmets), go Condition 1 (rifle magazine inserted, round in chamber), to seek cover immediately and to set up a 360-degree perimeter. To the astonishment of many Marines of 1/8, the situation in those initial days seemed to be in order and well in-hand, as buses transported the full-equipped Marines to their outlying positions across the airfield. Some Marines were even afforded the opportunity to shop in the remaining stores still braving the growing chaos.

Turnover with of the initial waves of 1/8 and 10th Mountain Division ‘Task Force Polar Bear,’ occurred immediately, with the site layouts, tours, and generous donations of Lenco Bears, JLTVs, and International MaxxPro up-armored vehicles to the airlifted Marines. With the armored assets turned over to the Marines, scratch-units of CAATs (Combined Anti-Armor Teams) could be formed to rove the expanse of the airfield perimeter, while providing deterrence and higher elevation to fire in the rising terrain the fronted the airport. A contingency plan amongst the combined U.S forces soon formed, dubbed the “Alamo Plan,” which entailed a final, last-ditch stand at the collocated Joint-Operations Center (JOC). As the first day passed for the consolidated companies of 1/8, the situation on the ground began to change rapidly. Taliban forces stormed through Kabul, sweeping aside the little resistance the ANA holdouts offered. This rapid advance only heightened the need of civilians to escape this total collapse. Adding to a growing list of players in this developing conflict, a multitude of allied foreign nations supported the Kabul evacuation, considerably more numerous and varied than the Beirut MNPF. Also involved were the lesser known “Zero Units,” of the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS), whose shadowy origins and harsh crowd controlling tactics both facilitated the evacuation and aggravated, the tense situation between allied forces, the Taliban and civilians seeking refuge.

The sudden fall of Kabul, and the single point of departure that was Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) combined to create a channeled rush to a highly identifiable target, decreased defensive capabilities for U.S and allied nations, and a greater atmosphere of panic to the civilians. The resultant breakthroughs of Aghan civilians after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul caused the outnumbered 1/8 Marines to cover exceedingly long distances of open runway by foot and by vehicle. With only two battalions of Marine infantry, the vast distances of HKIA proved to too large to cover and control. With at least a half-mile between the North Gate and East Gate, both of which 1/8 had jurisdiction over, and the considerably greater distance between the civilian and military zones, it is no wonder that multiple breakthroughs occurred. These instances of consecutive breakthroughs also included unidentified gunmen infiltrating the perimeter and occupying buildings inside the airport, as evidenced by Aztec 1/8’s neutralization of three gunmen, who had shown hostile intent to both civilians and the Marines.

The continuous shifting of forces, from one hotspot on the perimeter, to another only decreased the defensive capabilities and lowered combat potency for 1/8, as relief by its sister battalions, 2/8 and 3/8, were remote, if not impossible, considerations. Indeed, Bravo Company and Weapons Company of 1/8 were formed into ad-hoc quick-reaction forces to not only plug the eventual gaps in the line, but to serve in additional capacities that again, only diminished the defensive capabilities of critical infrastructure. Additionally, having a perimeter within the surrounding urban infrastructure only further exposed 1/8 Marines. ROE’s during the fall of Kabul were more straightforward than those of Beirut, as they did not need blue or white cards to describe the various stages of proportional fire. ROE’s were readily understood and reflected the dynamic, sometimes hostile environment. Taking fire, 1/8 Marines returned fire and in more than one instance, lifted and shifted fires in consideration to the human terrain inside the airport. Considering the rising elevation of both urban dwellings and the mountainous terrain that enveloped HKIA, it is fortunate that Taliban and ISIS-K fighters did not establish more positions to lob torrents of indirect fire on the airport below, as had occurred in late August/September 1983. This could, and would have, caused scores of additional casualties amongst the exposed civilians on the open runway as well as the Marines working an active, commercial runway.

Can It All Be So Simple
Also, the command structures of the sole Marine battalions, however well-aligned, served under different chains of command, with 2/1 reporting through Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, Central Command, and 1/8 as the ground combat element for the 24th MEU. Moreover, the somewhat parallel command structures of the State Department seemed to affect the admittance criteria, and inevitably the flow of civilians, of the far-flung gates. As evidenced by 1/8 Marines and Corpsmen on the ground, the constant changes in the requisite documents only added to the confusion to both military and humanitarian efforts, further aggravating all involved on the ground. It can be argued that these multidirectional command structures affected the strategic decision-making in a shifting, and dynamic, political-military environment. Regardless of the complex command structure, the mission to evacuate over a hundred-thousand civilians and the retrograding of U.S forces, was a success, in large part due to the individual efforts and the quick adaptation of the Marines and attached Naval personnel on the ground.

Comparing Beirut 1983 and Kabul 2021:

Unlike Beirut 1983, the Marines, soldiers and attached Navy personnel in the Kabul Evacuation did not have ready access to sea, and the primary means of entry and exit had to be done by air. Support from naval gunfire support as well as U.S and French aircraft carriers provided not only deterrence to enemy forces but quick retaliation in Beirut, not the case in Kabul. Additionally, artillery support and mortars were not utilized in Kabul 2021 as in Beirut 1983, as the swarms of civilians were being used as not only concealment but as human shields by the Taliban and ISIS-K insurgents. At the cusp of victory, insurgents driving “technicals,” (civilian pickup trucks mounted with direct-fire weapons) and commandeered armored vehicles (abandoned by ANA forces) roamed the outskirts of the airport, as if almost on parade. Insurgent fighters intermingled with the jostling crowds, intimidating them with their newly acquired kit and upgraded forms of transportation. Individual insurgents also sought out civilians to deliver beatings and summary executions, as a form of crowd control. Marines manning the North, East and Abbey Gates could only watch, process selected civilians, and keep their guard up against hostile fire and intent. Both Beirut 1983 and Kabul 2021 involved a general static posture, over-reliance on host-nation forces to provide outlying security, and highly identifiable (and trafficked) U.S targets. The uncoordinated withdrawal of the IDF, as well as the disintegration of the ANA, left the burden of security to western, primarily U.S, forces. The defense of the 24th MAU included dispersed company and platoon-sized positions, where foot and mobile patrols could screen and interact with a population. HKIA, in Kabul, was for the most part an enclosed perimeter, where only special operations forces and Afghan NDS/Zero Units were the main players going outside the wire. Mobile patrols during Beirut were external, while up-armored mounted patrols in Kabul were internal to the perimeter. Beirut, and Lebanon write large, was not facing imminent collapse and for a time, had the IDF to prevent the Shia Amal and Syrian-backed Druze, from controlling Beirut, let alone the entire country. Enemy forces in Beirut 1983 included a wide range of religious faiths and political ideologies, which further confused, but did not prevent, efforts for political reconciliation.

The fall of Kabul, precipitated by a rapid offensive by Taliban forces, nevertheless included semi-autonomous groups and smatterings of ISIS-K fighters, who exploited the evolving situation. As the Taliban Summer Offensive grew, so did their armament, transportation, and boldness, as nothing succeeds like success. U.S forces during the Kabul evacuation were also sent in a piece-meal fashion, from the battalions down to individual platoons of companies. It must also be remembered that the USMNF had been conducting the security and evacuations from 1982 to 1984, a period of nearly two years, and involved multiple rotations of MAUs, the politically rife evacuation of the PLO, and external rescue missions (Qartaba, Dahr-el-Baydar). 1/8’s tenure in Beirut lasted a little over 6 months while 1/8’s role in the Kabul evacuation was over within 2 weeks. Both Beirut 1983 and Kabul 2021 had inherently different missions, while having civilian evacuation at its core. The differences in mission, ultimately, were meted out by differing political concerns, rules, regulations, and the flexibility give to local commanders. In both Beirut and Kabul, U.S/western forces had trained an up-start military force, of countries with little history (or success) with political or ethnic unification, to wage war along western parameters. Overreliance on supporting firepower (air/land/sea), high priorities placed on technology, and the host-nation adoption of western schemes of maneuver-to-contact, were incompatible for a HN force to stand on its own. Most notably, without naval gunfire support and use of FASTABs, or without the direct intervention of U.S ground-support, during the September/Mountain War of 1983, it is unlikely that the LAF (with desertions increasing) could have outgunned, or survived, the onslaught from various militias.

Conclusion:

In closing both episodes in 1/8’s history reflect great credit to all concerned services of the U.S Armed Forces. Both operations are another chapter in the battalion’s long, often brutal, battle history, but nevertheless show the necessity of grit, comradery, and esprit de corps needed to survive in all types of conflict environments. While hindsight is ‘20-20 vision,’ Marines, soldiers, sailors, and airmen must continually assess, and then reassess, their own history as there are patterns in human behavior and decision-making that stand the test of time and the impact of technology. Regardless of the political and strategic decisions enacted, and those not enacted, the individual and collective efforts of 1/8 Marines undoubtably saved countless thousands of lives, both American and Afghani. Adapting to new environments, serving in multiple combat and non-combat roles, and enacting the will of a convoluted strategic command structure, the Marines of 1/8 have contributed greatly to the traditions and legacy of the Marine Corps and will remain as a testament to true mission-readiness, comradeship, and esprit de corps.

This piece was written by an assistant writer, a "scribe" of American military and Marine Corps history, "Stash".